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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
ie Utah Supreme Courts has jurisdiction since this case was originally 
.led therin. Under the purview of the Utah Constitution, Article 1, 
iction 11 and U.C.A., 78-2-2 (3) (b) the Supreme Court has jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellee's attempt to reduced Appellant's brief to three catagories 
issues to be ruled upon by the Appeals Courts based upon law 
( S t a t u t u e S ) o n l y l g a u j - m y LIUS J-OOV,^ ~ ^ ^ ^ ^ , „ 
Appellant's brief. This case is a question of FACT and law. That fact and 
law is a mixture of State Statutes, Utah State Constitution, Federal 
Statutes, and the Unites States Constitution. 
Appellee relies upon Carter v. Utah Power and Light and Von Hake v. 
Thomas as the "standard of review" for addressing the law only. The 
application of these citings in this case is misplaced and erroneous. The 
analysis of these cases are contained herein. Appellant's standard of 
review is (among others) U.C.A., 78-21-3, Court to decide questions of law. 
" All questions, of law, including the admissability of evidence, the 
facts preliminary to such admission, the construction of statutes and other 
writings, and the application of the rules of evidence are to be decided 
by the court and all discussion of law addressed to it, Moreover, facts 
are m controversy as well as vilation of Mr. Barker's constitutional 
rights along with conflicting statutes ana mas be addressed. 
This is an appeal from a contempt of court and judgement of Appellant 
being an absconding debtor to avoid child support payments. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Same as Appellant's Brief. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mr. Barker was erroneously found to be an absconding debtor and 
incarcerated* After explaining to the court his legal duty to his current 
(second) family and children Mr. Barker was informed by the court that the 
first and primary obligation was to pay for the welfare debt of the first 
(welfare) family and that the others were secondary and that his new family 
did not constitute a material change of circumstances. 
This action was brought about through the efforts of the State of 
Utah, Department of Human Services utilizing primarily the statutes, or 
sections thereof, of the "Utah Human Services Code", U.C.A., 62a-l-101 and 
the "Unified Civil Liability for Support Act", U.C.A., 78-45-1. 
The second family is clearly being relegated to "second or third 
class" citizens with the first "welfare" family having first call on the 
financial resources of Mr. Barker. In Fact, once a pay order is initially 
set for the "welfare" family the second or subsequent "nonwelfare" family 
cannot request its rights for equal protection and support of their father; 
i.e., the payments to the "welfare" family can never be adjusted downward 
to meet the growing needs and requirements of the second family. Any 
additional children will forever be relegated to a second rate subservient 
position to the first "welfare" family. 
Through these statutes Mr. Barker and his children have and are being 
deprived of many rights and constitutional guarantees. These statutes must 
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all of his family restored. 
Mr. Barker, in fact and law, understands very well the Utah State 
child support enforcement laws and procedures. How these child support laws 
(1) conflict with and contradict other Utah State Statutes and 
"administrative procedures"; (2) conflict with and attempt to contradict 
the Utah State Constitution; (3) conflict with and contradict superior 
federal statutes and citings; and (4) conflict the United States 
Constitution. 
Appellee's argue that Mr. Barker's arguments are within 3 categories 
and they attempt to limit the standard of review for two of the categories 
to only questions of law. That is not so. All of the categories have 
facts that are in controversy so the standard of review should include 
questions of facts and the law as well as Constitutional rights violations. 
The case, cited by Appellee, Carter v. Utah Power and Light, 800 P.2d 1095 
(Utah 1990) does not apply to the instant matter since there was no claim 
to a constitutional rights deprivation in that case. The instant matter 
does, in fact, claim a gross constitutional deprivation of rights in many 
areas along with facts in controversy and instances of conflicts between 
the Utah statutes and the Utah Constitution.. For good cause shown in 
Appellant's court record a motion and demand is hereby made for a review 
of the facts and the law and there is no reason why a protective order 
should be issued or said facts should be withheld from either the public 
or the Appellate review courts. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has, on the record, denied it's own Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Appellee's arguments for the same have been 
overcome by Appellant; thereby indicating that the facts as well as the law 
2 
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arguments are merely three categories to be adjudicated on the standard of 
law review alone is frivolous, in bad faith, and moot. "Summary Judgment 
is proper only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." TransAmerica Cash 
Reserve, Inc., v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24 (Utah 1990). Utah 
Rules of Civil Proc, Rule 56 (c) . 
Further sanctions, moreover, should ensue, since attorneys of record 
by their signature on their brief have shown a disregard to the rights of 
Mr. Barker while they continue to increase the cost of litigation, to 
confuse the real issue, to hide the facts, to take up more court time 
needlessly, and further cause Mr. Barker more time in defending which 
results in loss of income, increased litigation cost, time away from his 
children, his business, and increased stress causing a loss of health. 
ARGUMENTS OF CASE 
POINT 1 
APPELLEE'S DO NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF MR. BARKER AND 
ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO COLLECT MONEY WHEN APPELLANT IS UNABLE TO PAY 
Mr. Barker does not participate in the Federal or State Social 
Security program therefore no benefits are available to him. Since Mr. 
Barker does not, in fact, use a State or Federal social security number 
(see Record page 71 line 2 through line 5. ) the state cannot force him 
into a contract under State or Federal Title IV-A of the Social Security 
Act or Aid to Families with Dependant Children "AFDC" since they have no 
jurisdiction over his person. Ms. McGillivray was receiving an "AFDC" 
grant as the custodial parent of the children. (see Record page 13 line 
12 through line 19. The lower court has indicated this is an appealable 
3 
The State of Utah has no jurisdiction over Mr. Barker's person with 
reference to the divorce since the state constructively frauded Mr. Barker 
when "They didn't tell him that a marriage license would give them 
jurisdiction over his children, as if he were a U.S. Constitution, 14th 
Amendment citizen " (See Record page 81 line 9 through page 82 line 7). 
The Sixth Judicial District Human Relations court does not have 
jurisdiction over the subject matter or person of Mr. Barker since Judge 
Tervort is a Juvenile Court Judge. No specific questions relating to 
support have been certified to the Human Relations Court. The children are 
not neglected or otherwise within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court 
under U.C.A., 78-3a-16. 
The Appellee's argument that they can intervene on behalf of Laura 
McGillivray to collect six hundred dollars per month for the support of 4 
children is not sound. The original divorce decree in the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law determined that the monthly amount of child support 
for 5 children would be 100 dollars per child or a total of 500 dollars but 
would automatically increase to 600 dollars per month when the oldest child 
reach age 18. See Record page 11 line 24 through page 12 line 8. Mr. 
Barker cannot be penalized by a provision of a divorce decree, for an 
automatic increase support money when his children leave the custodial 
parent's home, nor is it enforceable, unless there is a material change 
of circumstances pursuant to U.C.A., 78-45-7 (1) and Judicial 
Administration Rule 6-404. Grover v. Grover, 839 P.2d 871. Is the 
district court required to adhere to the statutes or is it above the law? 
The facts are clear from the history of this case that Mr. Barker was 
unable to pay child support due to involuntary loss of employment on at 
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McGillivray for support was acted upon for 5 years and included payment "in 
kind", ie., a house, car, food, clothing, etc. Said payment "in kind" was 
not allowed by the Office of Recovery services. 
U.C.A., 62A-9-104 (2) (b) however, allows the State to provide in kind 
assistance to Ms. McGillivray. Even today Mr. Barker is denied the right 
to provide "in kind" assistance, he therefore invokes his right to equal 
protection under the law pursuant to U.S. Constitution, 14th Amendment 
which applies to the common law as well as statutory law. 
If Appellee's can provide support "in kind" then Appellant should be 
equally protected in his right to do the same. Appellee attorneys know 
from the record, or should know, that Mr. Barker did not fail to provide 
payment "in kind" and financial support for 5 years until he was unable to 
do so due to involuntary circumstances. See Record page 100 line 8 through 
line 16. 
There was no notification by the Utah Department of Human Services 
that the Barker children were on welfare. See Record page 109 line 17 
through page 105 line 5. Pursuant to U.C.A., 63-la-l and more specifically 
U.C.A. 63-la-2, which says: "...Upon default in payment of any account 
receivable, the entity responsible for collecting the account shall send 
a notice, by certified mail, to the debtor at the debtor's last known 
address....", notification is required. It is common knowledge that 
notification is required but the lower court Judge would not allow Mr. 
Barker to enter onto the record admission of fact that the Office of 
Recovery Services did not notify him. See Record page 15 line 25 through 
page 16 line 18. The lower court abused it1 discretion and abused process. 
Appellee's have not overcome by argument or evidence, on the record or off 
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Appellant was noticed by Appellee Ms. McGillivray's Affidavit that 
the children were, in fact, not on welfare from a time period prior to 
1988. See Page 4, lines 15 through line 18. Affidavit of Laura (Barker) 
McGillivray in Support of Her Objection to Defendant's Motion for 
Restraining Order dated 19 October 1988. 
POINT 2 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT MAKE SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND DID NOT PROPERLY 
REVIEW THE FACTS IN REFUSING TO MODIFY APPELLANT'S PETITION 
Appellee's argue on page 12 of their brief, or make it appear by distortion 
of the actual facts, that Mr. Barker voluntarily quit employment. That is 
not supported by the facts. Appellee's, on the same page, make it appear 
that Mr. Barker has no basis for his constitutional rights violation claims 
since he voluntarily accepted employment with lesser pay when there was 
no other employment available. The lower court arbitrarily and with abuse 
of process determined without any specific findings that Mr. Barker's 
employment at the Hecla mine was to be used as a standard for measuring 
historical earnings when, in fact, the specific employment was an 
overemployment situation and which was pointed out to the Judge. See 
Record page 120 line 3 through line 19. 
Appellee's, in their excessive zeal to collect money for the State 
fail to exercise the common sense, inasmuch as they admit that the reason 
Mr. Barker was unemployed was due to cutbacks or layoffs. See Record page 
116 line 5 through line 10. The facts are as pointed out on Record page 
40, line 6 through line 11 and page 41 line 17 through line 21, that Mr. 
Barker was involuntarily laid off, due to a corporate bankruptcy on one 
occasion and on another occasion involuntarily lost his work contract due 
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Barker to loose a business placing him in considerable debt. See Record 
page 49 line 15 through page 50 line 2. 
Due to a decline of economic conditions for mining and other work in 
the area Mr. Barker was preparing to change occupations at the time. See 
Record page 41 line 14 through line 16. 
Appellee's argue that Mr. Barker's claim of medical injuries is 
contradictory. See Record page 116 line 5 through line 10. Mr. Barker has 
a back problem which he testified hiding from his employers, and which is 
aggravated by an old injury and therefore chose, at the time, an 
occupational change that allowed him to work around the injury, with the 
assistance of his new wife and family. See Record page 46 line 18 through 
page 47 line 21, Record page 50 line 21 through 25, Record page 58 line 8 
through page 59 line 10, and Record page 103, line 1 through 17. Also see 
Exhibit- Chiropractors statement as mentioned on Record page 56 line 12 
through page 57 line 19. There is no contradiction. 
Since the State of Utah has, in the past paid all expenses for Ms. 
McGillivray to go to college for her occupational change; it is certainly 
reasonable that Mr. Barker can change his occupation when necessity 
requires, ie., no other work of a like nature was available in the area at 
the time. Mr. Barker certainly has Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 
_1 right to life, which includes the right to work along with other rights 
stated in his Brief. Also a U.S. Constitutional, 1st Amendment right and 
a U.S. Constitution, 14th Amendment right to equal protection under the 
law is guaranteed. The facts are Mr. Barker bore the expense of his 
occupational change out of his own pocket while the taxpayers paid for Ms. 
McGillivray' s. Mr. Barker had at the time, and has now, a Utah 
7 
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intentionally avoid child support. The historical facts show that for 5 
years Mr. Barker supported his family until he was unable to do so, in part 
due to legal actions of appellee's, ie., incarceration resulting in a loss 
of a business. Mr. Barker did not intend to avoid child support, nor is 
there any evidence or specific detailed findings on the record in arriving 
at that conclusion. See Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law dated 
16 July 1993, item number 14 in Findings and item number 7 in Conclusions, 
which simply say "Defendant is intentionally underemployed." See also 
item 16 which says " Defendant is underemployed of the purpose of avoiding 
his child support payments." His career change was simply, at the time, 
not making the money the state demanded. See Also Findings of Facts and 
Conclusions of Law dated 19 August 1993 and mailed 30 August 1993 item 
number 5 which says " The court finds that, in the trial on June 30, 1993, 
the Defendant, Mr. Michael Robert Barker, failed to support his minor 
children as per the order of this court and was, therefore, held in 
contempt of court and sentenced to 30 days in the Sanpete County Jail." 
Contempt is "criminal" in nature as explained in Point 6 below. 
Why did the state of Utah impute income to Mr. Barker when he was 
making his career change in violation of the U.C.A., 78-45-7.5 (d) iii, 
since there is has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. 
Barker's alleged intentional underemployment was for the purpose of 
avoiding child support? The lower court did not follow said statute and 
has abused it's discretion, and with abuse of process has denied Mr. 
Barker statutory and constitutional rights protection. Considering that 
Mr. Barker had a new growing family responsibility of a wife and 5 
children to support it is not reasonable to suppose that he would work 
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for his own demise. 
Mr. Barker had begun his farming career change prior to this action 
before the court and even prior to a prior court action in Judge Tibb's 
court in 1991. There are no arguments that rebut the facts that Mr. Barker 
was involuntarily unemployed through no fault of his own, or that Mr. 
Barker sought employment at the only other mine in the area but was unable 
to obtain employment, or that his last mining contract was an 
overemployment situation. The facts do no even point to the possibility 
that Mr. Barker was intentionally voluntarily unemployed. See Affidavit 
of Mr. Barker dated 9 July 1993, item number 5. Will Mr. Barker be denied 
his statutory and constitutional rights to change his career when no other 
work of a like nature was in the area? Appellee's argue that several other 
mining operations were and are available in the area. See Record page 118 
line 7 through line 10 and Record page 119 line 5 through line 6. That is 
false. At the time there was only one gold mine which had merely initiated 
a limited start up operation. As was stated in Mr. Barker's Affidavit of 
Mr. Barker dated 9 July 1993, item number 5, at the post Judgment trial, 
there were 1500 applications for one job. Declining economic conditions 
at the time prevented Mr. Barker from obtaining employment and rather than 
go on the welfare dole Mr. Barker made a career change in an attempt to 
establish a well paying business in the St. George area.. In this 
particular occupational change one does not simply quit one day for higher 
paying employment. Farming to be successful requires a commitment to the 
long term not the 9am to 5pm that Appellee's enjoy at taxpayers expense. 
Utah Constitution, Article 12, Section 18, which was law at the time, says: 
"Every person in Utah is free to obtain and enjoy employment whenever 
possible, and a person or corporation, or their agent, servant, or employee 
thereof, maliciously interfering or hindering in any way, with any person 
9 
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any other corporation or person, shall be deemed guilty of a crime. The 
Legislature shall provide by law for the enforcement of this section." 
Appellee's have interfered with Appellant's enjoying employment since 
as a direct result of contempt incarceration Appellant's wife who was 
unable to properly handle all the activities of the operation during that 
time has divorced, leaving Appellant without transportation, with two 
children of tender age, making it impossible to conduct the operation in 
the same way. 
Appellee's Argument that Mr. Barker's financial situation had improved is 
simply not factual in light of the above. Appellee's go back five years, 
before Mr. Barker's change of circumstances, in disregard of his present 
career change, to determine his earning capacity. Appellee's cite Hill v. 
Hill, 869 P.2d (Utah App. 1994) in evaluating income. The trial court in 
"Hill" however, took into account husband's last three years of employment 
and his current employment. In the instant matter the last three years and 
Mr. Barker's current employment are for the time period during which he was 
continuously engaged in his farming career change. Moreover, unlike "Hill 
who voluntarily quit a job, Mr. Barker was involuntarily terminated due to 
shutdowns due to corporate failure. "Hill" further accepted imputation of 
income as proper: Mr. Barker did not. In Grover v. Grover, 839 P.2d 871, 
873 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) the court makes a determination of a financial 
situation of the obligor at the time. Appellee's argue however, that Mr. 
Barker's earning capacity should be based on a period 6 years earlier, at 
the time of his divorce, along with a recent past mining employment which 
was an overemployment situation. See Record page 117 line 2 through page 
118 line 6. Mr. Barker had been farming for about 3 1/2 years prior to 
this instant matter, but Appellee attorney attempts to go back 6 years 
10 
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more money when his circumstances were different. 
Appellee's attorney, Graf indicated on the record that a material 
change of circumstances for income had, in fact, taken place. See Record 
page 117 line 5 through 12 and page 118 line 3 through line 6. 
The lower court should not have imputed income to Mr. Barker and it has 
abused it's discretion. As stated elsewhere, income cannot be imputed 
when there is a career change. Furthermore, additional factors that go 
beyond the critical question of whether the drop in earnings was voluntary 
must be addressed. It will be found that during times of local or national 
business recession or depression people have, if they were fortunate, 
accepted work of a lesser pay. The issue is not simply whether or not said 
voluntary acceptance of work of lesser pay was by choice, but whether or 
not other work of a like nature was available. Mr. Barker prudently 
accepted work of a lower pay due to the unavailability of mining work at 
the time. At the time Mr. Barker was heavily in debt, in part caused by 
action of Appellee's having put him in jail. In the decision to do so he 
contemplated the providing for his new family while at the same time 
planing for the long term of doing the same for all his children by 
developing a business. Absolutely no evidence exists on the record that 
Mr. Barker had intent to avoid child support payments. See Record page 100 
line 5 through 16. The finding of the lower court is clearly erroneous. 
The facts are that a material change of circumstances did take place. 
Mr. Barker had remarried and was supporting a wife and 5 children prior 
to the beginning of the most recent 1991 and 1993 Orders to Appear and Show 
cause. See Record page 94 line 16 through page 95 line 15. The lower court 
11 
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circumstances for a new wife and two natural children on the record but 
then ruled to the contrary thereby abusing it's process. See Record page 
97 line 3 through 5. Specific findings are not sufficiently detailed which 
justify the lower court arriving at it's conclusion. See Finding of Facts 
and Conclusions of Law dated 16 July 1993, item number 13 in Findings and 
item number 6 in Conclusions which simply say there has been no significant 
or material change of circumstances since the divorce. The findings of the 
lower court are clearly erroneous and with abuse of discretion. Appellee's 
attorney Graf indicated on the record that the law on the books required 
Mr. Barker to provide primary support for his stepchildren. See Record 
page 95 line 7 through 21. 
Mr. Barker had also been farming for some time prior to the 1991 and 
most recent 1993 action. See Record page 39 line 7 through page 40 line 
3. The lower court erred when it did not allow for the change of 
circumstances for Mr. Barker's new family including the stepchildren. 
Said change of circumstances were first plead in Judge Tibb's court in 
1991. See Record page 21 line 8 through line 18. The change in 
circumstances should be allowed from the date it was first plead. See 
Record page 105 line 1 through page 106 line 4. 
Appellee's are trying to force Mr. Barker into violating the equal 
protection clause of the U.S. Constitution, 14th Amendment when they try 
to invoke U.C.A., 78-45-7.7 (5) which in essence requires that Mr. 
Barker's children of his former marriage be supported with a greater money 
amount than his is able to provide for his children of a subsequent 
marriage; since the statute will not allow Mr. Barker's change of 
circumstances to decrease a child support award so that he can support his 
12 
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the U.S. Constitution, 14th Amendment. Mr. Barker cannot be compelled to 
unequally support his children and violate the equal protection clause of 
the Constitution as well as other constitutional safeguards as stated in 
Appellant's Brief. 
POINT 3 
THE TRIAL COURT HAS NOT YET ACTED UPON A RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Appellee's ignore the fact that pursuant to Ut. R. or Civil Proc, 
Rule 60 (b) (6) Appellant filed a second Motion for Relief of Judgment and 
Order which was mailed to the court from jail on 24 July 1993 which was not 
acted upon. In paragraph 4 Mr Barker clarifies that his net income from 
self employment was difference by much less than the erronious gross income 
appellee's allege. Appellee's attorney argued that Appellant's gross from 
his farming operation be calculated on not what U.C.A., 78-45-7.5 (4) (a) 
requires, namely gross income from a business shall be calculated by 
subtracting necessary expenses from gross receipts. The court never 
considered said motion or subsequent argument by both parties. 
POINT 4 
TRIAL COURT'S ORDER FOR CONTEMPT IS DURING THE SAME TIME PERIOD OF A 
PRIOR COURT ORDER WHEREIN THE CONTEMPT WAS PURGED 
The previous judgment entered on 29 April 1991 required Mr. Barker to 
provide an accounting of his farming operation for six months. The six 
month accounting was provided to Judge Tibb's court which accounting was 
about six months within the time period from March 1991 to January 1993. 
It is obvious that the time periods overlap by six months during which 
time period Mr. Barker was purged of his contempt. Mr. Barker was found 
in contempt during the same time period for which he had purged the earlier 
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acton". Felt v. Felt, 27 Utah 2d 103, 493 P.2d 620 (1972). 
If the lower court in 1991 allowed a purging of the contempt charge 
which reflected a career change and an obvious change of circumstances and 
found no intent to avoid child support payments is it not, under the 
doctrine of res judicata, eligible for estoppel when the state of Utah 
brings up another contempt charge again two years later for the same thing 
involving only a different time but overlapping period? 
POINT 5 
APPELLEE'S NEW ACTION THROUGH THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT GIVES THEM NO 
JURISDICTION OVER APPELLANT 
Appellee's go to great length to ascertain that the instant matter is 
separate, since it is now the Department of Human Services bringing action, 
from all other actions. The Department of Human Services has paid funds 
authorized under Title IV-A of the Social Security Act. Mr. Barker does 
not participate in the Social Security scheme which has not been properly 
ratified by the 50 states comprising the United States of America and 
therefore, is not under the said jurisdiction. See Record page 71, line 
2 through line 19. 
The other issues of fact which Appellee's try to dismiss have to do 
with no jurisdiction over the person of Mr. Barker due to no contractual 
nexus existing as explained in Appellant's Brief. Also, the matter is 
res judicata since no action was taken by the lower court for about two 
years since the 1991 action wherein the contempt charge was allowed to be 
purged. 
The fact is that Ms. McGillivray broke her original contract for 
support with Mr. Barker, ie., sold a nearly paid for home which the court 
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thereby becoming voluntarily more welfare dependant, along with other 
written contract provisions from the beginning of the couples original 
Mexican divorce, and then entered into another contract with the Utah 
State Department of Human Services. Mr. Barker has not entered the 
jurisdiction of the Department of Human Services by contract under U.C.C., 
70A-1-207 or other applicable law and explicitly reserves all his rights. 
The Utah State of Utah constructively frauded Mr. Barker when it did 
not inform him that his children could be taken away from him and given to 
another person having mere custody and therefore has no jurisdiction over 
his person. 
POINT 6 
APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO THE SAME RIGHT TO COUNSEL PROVIDED BY THE 
DISTRICT COURT IN A PRIOR ACTION FOR THE SAME ALLEGED OFFENSE 
First, Mr. Barker was not able to afford counsel nor was it appointed, 
and he was further denied counsel in his first appeal by right pursuant 
to U.C.A., 77-32-1 and U.C.A. 77-32-2 since his contempt was alleged to be 
"civil" in nature. Appellee McGillivray however, was provided counsel for 
to litigate not only what the Utah Department of Human Services claimed was 
owed to that agency but also to litigate what she claimed was owed from a 
prior court order. Mr. Barker's United States Constitution, 14th 
Amendment right to equal protection under the law, in addition to Utah 
Constitution, Article 1, Section 24 rights have been violated. 
The lower court held repeatedly stated on the record that Appellee 
attorney Graf was only trying to collect the money that the taxpayers had 
paid through the Utah Department of Human Services to Ms. McGillivray. See 
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that he and the Office of Recovery Services were trying to collect a prior 
court order of 600 hundred dollars per month. See Record page 13 line 8 
through page 15 line 4. Also see the original Order to Appear and Show 
Cause. Mr. Barker was prevented by the lower court judge from finding out 
how much money the Utah State Department of Human Services actually paid 
Ms. McGillivray. See Record page 19 through page 20 line 16 and Record 
page 64 line 20 through page 65 line 10. The Utah State Department of 
Human Services, as seen from the above, is lumping the prior $600 Dollar 
child support award into its original order and is even including the $600 
dollar amount into its internal accounting practices and attempting to 
obtain the entire amount irrespective of what that agency actually paid 
out; and further; they give no accounting as to what they actually paid 
out. In short that agency and attorney Graf are trying to collect for Ms. 
McGillivray a prior court ordered amount pursuant to U.C.A., 78-45-9 (1) 
(a) and (b) which say the attorney general or the county attorney 
represent the Office of Recovery Services to "... on behalf of the 
obligee, to enforce the obligee's right of support against the obligor." 
U.C.A., 78-45-9 (a) is not legal and should be repealed. Mr. Barker 
is poor, and cannot afford an attorney, in part due to actions of 
Appellee's as shown on the record earlier, but he is denied equal 
protection under the law pursuant to the U.S. Constitution, 14th Amendment 
since he does not have the same right to counsel as Appellee Ms. 
McGillivray. 
In McWhirter v. Donaldson et al, 104 P. 731 says: 
"Under Comp. Laws 1907, Subsection 133, providing that no practicing 
attorney shall became (sic) surety in a suit in which he is engaged as 
attorney, attorneys at law cannot act in the dual capacity of surety and 
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attorney in the same action. 
The Utah State Department of Human Services has attempted to act as a 
surety for Mr. Barker notwithstanding that the contract for support that 
Ms. McGillivray entered into with that agency is a different contract than 
she entered into with Mr. Barker for child support. Surety is defined, in 
part, in Black's Law Dictionary as "Everyone who incurs a liability in 
person or estate, for the benefit of another, without sharing in the 
consideration, stands in the position of a "surety," whatever may be the 
form of his obligation. Howell v. War Finance Corporation, C C A . Ariz., 
71 F.2d 237, 243." 
Notwithstanding that Mr. Barker maintains the fact that he has not 
entered into any contract with the Human Service agency and that he as a 
principal " has no right to control the conduct of the agent with respect 
to matters entrusted to the agent. This right of control is the primary 
or essential test of an agency relationship without which no agency exists 
and the same standard applies when the agency relationship is implied. " 
Nidiffer v. Clinchfield R. Co. (1980, Tenn App) 600 SW2d 242 10 Air 4th 
1260. "The principal-agent relationship results from the manifestation of 
consent by one person to another that the other shall act on the first 
person's behalf and subject to his control, and the other must consent so 
to act: whether the relationship exists is a question of fact and the party 
alleging the existence of the agency has the burden of proof." White v. 
Boucher (1982, Minn) 322 NW2d 560, 34 Air 4th 179. This lack of contract 
is more fully explained in Appellant's Brief and relates to the Uniform 
Commercial Code and other applicable law. 
Mr. Barker hereby motions the court for his rights Sua Sponte since the 
lower court actively sought to deny him his rights instead of holding them 
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Second, the court did not make specific findings of fact which meets 
the general rule of proving contempt. There is no clear and convincing 
evidence of intent to avoid child support in this civil matter which led 
to Appellants1 contempt incarceration. Also Mr. Barker has been unable to 
obtain that portion of the record which is on the 10:00am tape number DR-
7 6 and after 1360 on the tape, which relates to Judge Tervort making the 
comment "well that takes care of that." , thereby indicating that the 
contempt charge was purged. As is evidenced on the record the lower court 
and the Appellate Court did not follow the rules of appellate procedure so 
that the transcript, which was repeatedly requested, was not available to 
Mr. Barker pursuant to those rules. This portion was repeatedly requested 
verbally and by letters to Mr. Lidell, the court reporter. 
The Appellee's attorney argued but did not present any evidence or 
witnesses testifying that Mr. Barker could confront as to alleged 
intentional underemployment for the purpose of avoiding child support. Nor 
did the lower court allow the right to assistance of counsel. Therefore 
Mr. Barker's due process rights were not provided by the lower court. U. 
S. Constitution, 14th Amendment, U.C.A.,78-32-3, as cited in Von Hake v. 
Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988). 
In the prior same 1991 civil matter before Judge Tibb's District 
Court, counsel was provided to Mr. Barker because there was the threat of 
"body execution" or incarceration. The contempt order that Mr. Barker 
purged was civil in nature since there was a conditional provision whereby 
relief was obtained from the accounting given to the court by him. Von 
Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988). Nevertheless, Judge Tibb's did 
properly appoint an attorney named Mr. Berry as counsel to Mr. Barker. See 
18 
Record page 106 line 23 tnrougn page iuo nuc «±. m C ±.^^„^ _.. 3 __ 
should be obvious since at the beginning of adjudication by the court it 
could not determine, prior to its findings, whether or not the contempt 
would be classified "criminal" or "civil" in nature. Judge Tervort on the 
other hand gambled that Mr. Barker would not be held in "criminal" contempt 
in this civil matter, but lost, since the determinants for the supposed 
"criminal" contempt were present resulting in a denial of Mr. Barker's 
substantive right to counsel. 
The primary determinant of whether an order for contempt is labeled 
civil or criminal is the trial court's purpose in entering the order. "A 
contempt order is criminal if its purpose is to vindicate the court's 
authority, as by punishing an individual for disobeying an order, even if 
the order arises from civil proceedings." Von Hake v. Thomas 759 P.2d 
1162 (Utah 1988) . 
The 1993 instant matter, relating to contempt, is "criminal" in 
nature since the purpose of incarceration was to punish Mr. Barker for not 
having paid child support and it is fixed and unconditional. Von Hake v. 
Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988). See Findings of Facts and Conclusions 
of Law dated 16 July 1993 the Conclusion 11 and 12 which say: "11. 
Defendant should be held in contempt of court for failure to make the child 
support payments as ordered for the period from March 1, 1991, through 
January 31, 1993. 12. Defendant should serve 30 days in the Sanpete 
County jail as penalty for his judgment of contempt, said 30 days to begin 
immediately...." Judge Tervort has erred with abuse of discretion and 
abuse of process in denying Mr. Barker his right to counsel. See Record 
page 127 line 3 through line 5. 
Looking at Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 1119 as cited in Von Hake v. 
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elements justifying a civil non-support contempt order were not met in 
reference to Mr. Barker. Namely : (1) The person cited for contempt 
knew what was required, (2) that he had the ability to comply; and (3) 
that he willfully and intentionally failed to do so. 
In reference to (1) above, Mr. Barker knew there was a support 
obligation from a prior court order he was unable to pay , but he did not 
know, since he had not been noticed by the Utah Department of Human 
Services, that the state of Utah had paid "AFDC" money to Appellee 
McGillivray and that they were trying to collect it. 
In reference to (2) above, the career change that Mr. Barker entered 
into prior to the instant matter by its very nature is not a career change 
that cannot be terminated in a short time. In otherwords, once an egg 
producer has his operation on a constant basis as Mr. Barker has done he 
cannot simply quit and loose several years effort in attempting to make in 
a profitable concern. Mr. Barker could not comply with the court order 
once he became committed, locked in, as it were, to the long term operation 
which was subsequent to his involuntary loss of work, as cited to the 
record above, and subsequent to his aggravated health condition. A new 
business usually does not show a profit for several years after it is 
established. See Record page 102 line 21 through 25, and Record 4 9 line 
5 through page 50 line 2. 
Mr. Barker's new career change, as is usual with new endeavors, was 
not making a profit at the time and he was unable to make payments. See 
Record page 33, line 10 through page 34 line 4. The court knew that he 
was involved in a career change and was unable to pay and there is no 
indication anywhere on the record that said career change was intentional 
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belief unsupported by any facts, without any investigation on the part of 
appellee's attorney. 
In reference to (3) above, Mr. Barker did not refuse to pay. Mr. 
Barker did try to stipulate in Judge Tibb's court in 1991 that he would pay 
a small amount as he was able to but attorneys for the State refused. Mr. 
Barker also asked for more time to pay in 1993. See Record page 110 line 
16 through 22, and Record page 112 line 3 through line 4. 
Moreover, in the 1991 court's order Mr. Barker was allowed to purge 
the contempt order for the same alleged offense with no findings of 
intentional child support avoidance. Two years later the Utah State 
Department of Human Services brought up the same matter only for a 
different time period. The matter is res judicata. 
There is no "clear and convincing" evidence on the record which is 
necessary in proving civil contempt nor are there any elements evidenced 
on the record which show "beyond a reasonable doubt" that Mr. Barker is 
underemployed for the purpose of avoiding child support. Von Hake v. 
Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988). 
There certainly are no specific written findings of fact and 
conclusions of law for each substantive element in proving (1) knowing what 
was required, (2) having the ability to comply, (3) intentional failure or 
refusal to do so, (especially intent). The court has erred and abused it's 
discretion. Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (unable to pay but 
incarcerated him any way and would not provide him with counsel.) 
Based on the fact that there are: (1) facts in controversy which 
affect Mr. Barker's constitutional rights and, statutes which conflict 
with each other as well as with the Utah and United States Constitutions, 
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do not satisfy substantive requirements the order of contempt is 
appealable. Von Hake v. Thomas 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988). 
Mr. Barker has suffered great nonrepairable harm as a result of his 
incarceration. His wife left him in part because of having to do all the 
work of the farming operation as well as the fear of having to do it again. 
Mr. Barker was left with no transportation with which to deliver his eggs 
or haul feed for his flock. He was left with two children of tender years, 
a one year old baby in diapers and a three year old to tend by himself. 
During the time of his incarceration the farming business deteriorated in 
that chickens were mismanaged and a significant egg production loss 
resulted due to his being absent. The mental and physical strain has 
resulted in a need to depend on neighbors in time of physical incapacity, 
and a subsequent reduction of laying hens has been necessary in order to 
physically do the work. For this Mr. Barker is asking an additional 
100,000 thousand dollars in pecuniary and punitive damages. Appellee's 
attorney arguments are frivilous, and in bad faith. 
The lower court denied Mr. Barker's right to stay his jail sentence 
due to its "strong feelings". See Record page 125 line 9 through page 125 
line 14. The court has with abuse of discretion abused it process. 
POINT 7 
APPELLANT ALLEGES VIOLATION OF RULE 11 AND FALSIFICATION OF RECORD 
Mr. Barker raised the issue of falsification of the record at the very 
beginning of the proceedings. See Record page 109 line 3 through line 16. 
Sanctions under Utah Rules of Civil Proc, Rule 11 and award for 
iamages should be imposed against Appellees since Appellant has been harmed 
and deprived of his constitutional rights to equal protection under the 
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Appellant's Brief and Addendum to Brief other matters relating to sanctions 
are argued above. 
As pertaining to Rule 11 in reference to Appellee Ms. McGillivray 
having an attorney to litigate her alleged arrears of child support by a 
prior divorce decree and monies allegedly owed the Department of Human 
Services: "This rule emphasizes an attorney's public duty as an officer 
of the court, as opposed to the attorney's private duty to represent a 
client's interest zealously. Clark v. Booth, 821 P.2d 1146 (1991). See 
Affidavit of Appellant dated 17 September 1994. Mr. Barker did not have 
the same right to counsel and without cost as Ms. McGillivray. 
Attorneys for the Appellee's have with full knowledge, information and 
intent attempted to deprive Mr. Barker of his Utah and U.S. Constitutional 
rights as well as depriving him of his statutory rights and privileges. 
Evidence of the same, in addition to the arguments above, is found in the 
Conclusion to Appellee's Brief wherein they state: "The lower court also 
properly specifically outlined its findings of fact and conclusions of law 
based upon the record and the law." The obvious missing elements that were 
not properly and specifically ruled upon were the facts. The facts. 
The lower court did not properly address the facts on the record and 
has abused its discretion and has also abused its' process. 
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Mr. Barker Prays for the following relief: 
1. That Mr. Barker's arguments should not be summarily rejected since Mr. 
Barker has continually demanded all of his rights which have been violated. 
The Appellate Court should adjudicate on the facts in controversy as well 
as issues of law and issues at law. 
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vindictive or avaricious ex-wife, who refuses to work or cooperate, to 
place a burdensome accumulating debt for the purpose of harassing him so 
that he cannot engage in a career change or live a respectable existence. 
Careful review of the facts will prove that this case is, in the words of 
Utah Supreme Court Chief Justice Crockett, "subject to exceptions under 
particular circumstances," Openshaw v. Openshaw, 105 Utah 574, 578, 133 
P.2d 528, 530. 
3. For sanctions against Appellee's attorneys attempt to hide the facts 
which appear in the Record Transcript since it has resulted in harm to 
Appellant, ie., alienation of affection from his wife at the time, loss of 
health, income, etc. 
4. To find that the Utah Department of Human Services has no jurisdiction 
over the person of Mr. Barker. 
5. To award sanctions or pecuniary and punitive damages because 
Appellee's attorneys have litigated in violation of the law since they are 
attempting to act as a surety for a party to the action. 
6. Reverse findings of fact and conclusions of law to show that Mr. 
Barker is not intentionally underemployed for the purpose of avoiding child 
support. 
7. That there is in fact a material change of circumstances which 
included a wife, natural children and stepchildren. 
8. That there is a material change of circumstances based on a reduction 
of income of Mr. Barker. 
9. To hold Utah Department of Human Services guilty of maliciously 
interfering with employment that Mr. Barker had already obtained. 
10. Find that the lower court has abused it's discretion and abused it's 
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process as alleged above. 
11. Award Mr. Barker an additional 100 thousand dollars for sanctions and 
pecuniary and punitive damages based on the above. 
12. To provide any other relief as the court deems proper. 
Dated 19 September 1994 Signed 
VERIFICATION 
I, Michael R. Barker, do affirm, and say and verify that the foregoing is 
true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief and 
is not for the purpose of delay and it is done in good faith.~ 
/^ 
Dated 19 September 1994 S: 
L l l U l l U C l L X U i l CtilU. J J C 1 X C 1 CILIK 
Dated ig^ sgfeptember 1994 
Dated 19 September 1994 
Witnes 
Witness 
CERTIFICATION OF MAILING 
I, MICHAEL R. BARKER, certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Response to Appellee's Brief was mailed, postage prepaid, or hand 
delivered to the following: 
Attorney General 
C/OPaul Graff #1229 
Asst. Atty. Gen'l 
201 East 500 North 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Laura B. McGillivray 
202. W. 300 N. 
Manti, Utah ff-ffc*2 
Court Clerk, Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
on y£ September 1994. Signed 
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